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ABSTRACT 
30 years ago PABX systems were compromised by hackers wanting to make long 
distance calls at some other entities expense. This activity faded as telephony 
became cheaper and PABX systems had countermeasures installed to overcome 
attacks. Now the world has moved onto the provision of telephony via broadband 
enabled Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) with this service now being provided 
as a replacement for conventional fixed wire telephony by major 
telecommunication providers worldwide.  Due to increasing bandwidth it is 
possible for systems to support multiple voice connections simultaneously.  The 
networked nature of the Internet allows for attackers of these VoIP systems to 
enumerate and potentially attack and compromise a wide range of vulnerable 
systems. This paper is an outline of preliminary research into malfeasant VoIP 
activity on the Internet. 
Keywords: VoIP, honeypot 
INTRODUCTION 
Voice over IP systems are replacing conventional switched wire telephone 
devices, these systems rely on Internet connectivity for the transmission of voice 
conversations. Many large corporations have been successfully using these types 
of systems over a number of years to lower communications costs relating to 
telephony. We are now seeing this technology being placed into homes through 
such initiatives as the UK-based BT Home, Australian based iinet BOB and 
various American offerings. These systems work by replacing conventional fixed 
line telephony with broadband connected wireless enabled routers that provide 
not only Internet access but VoIP services within the home or business.   
Some 30 years ago computer hackers compromised PABX systems to facilitate 
cheap long-distance calling through the rerouting of their modem calls through 
these compromised systems. This illegal rerouting enabled the hackers for the cost 
of a local call to stay connected to long-distance phone calls for any period of 
time that they wished to. The actual costs for such long-distance calls was borne 
by the owner of the PABX system not the hacker and diagnostics on these 
systems often only indicated that the calls originated from the PABX. This mode 
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of attack started to decrease as PABX developers hardened their devices against 
attack by these interloping attackers by placing countermeasures in the PABX. 
This coupled with long distance telephony becoming cheaper and eventually 
broadband digital services such as ADSL and ISDN replacing acoustic modems 
and the PSTN as the main carrier for Internet traffic. 
Due to technological restraint it was relatively difficult to have more than a one-
to-one connection between the attacker and responding devices. This paradigm 
has now changed with the introduction of VoIP systems where an attacker can 
control many telephony sessions from the one device. 
VoIP is most typically sent as a clear text transmission and is relatively trivial task 
to intercept with a simple packet sniffer. The transport for the supporting 
protocols of VoIP are typically UDP based. In addition there are already a variety 
of tools that can intercept and replay voice conversations that are conducted over 
VoIP channels. Not all of the tools capable of interception or enumeration are in 
the realm of hacker based tools some are legitimate packages such as Wireshark 
or NMAP.  
VoIP systems suffer from the same Achilles' heel that all core services do in that 
for it to be useful it must be available for connection from unknown parties. In the 
same way that a Web server serves web pages to requesting clients likewise a 
VoIP server must allow unknown connections to start for a voice conversation to 
occur. As a result much of the authentication and authorisation has to be open, 
disallowing the provider of the service basic protections against malicious activity 
from parties who are interested in enumerating or compromising a system. 
THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE – FACTORS INTERSECTING 
There are various tools available for the enumeration and subsequent compromise 
of VoIP systems. The following table represents some of the more common tools 
and indicates their abilities many of these tools have been freely available since 
2005. 
Name  Description/Modus Operandii
SIPVicious Tool Suite 
‐ svmap, svwar, 
svcrack 
svmap  lists the SIP devices found in an network. svwar maps 
active extensions on a PBX. Svcrack  is a  password cracker 
for SIP  
sipflanker  Many (if not most) VoIP devices have available a Web GUI 
for their configuration, management, and report generation. 
And unfortunately it is also common for the username and 
password to have the default values. 
sipcrack  Sipdump finds SIP logins, then sipcrack is used bruteforce 
passwords on the identified logins 
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Name  Description/Modus Operandii
steganrtp  SteganRTP is a steganography tool which establishes a full‐
duplex steganographic data transfer protocol utilizing Real‐
time Transfer Protocol (RTP) packet payloads as the cover 
medium. The tool provides interactive chat, file transfer, and 
remote shell. 
sipp  Test tool and traffic generator
sipsak  sipsak is a small command line tool for developers and 
administrators of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
applications. It can be used for some simple tests on SIP 
applications and devices. 
VoIPER  VoIPER is a security toolkit that aims to allow developers and 
security researchers to easily, extensively and automatically 
test VoIP devices for security vulnerabilties 
UCSniff  UCSniff is an assessment tool that allows users to rapidly 
test for the threat of unauthorized VoIP eavesdropping. 
UCSniff supports SIP and Skinny signaling, G.711‐ulaw and 
G.722 codecs, and a MITM ARP Poisoning mode. 
 
In addition to this, there have been numerous articles in the literature that relate to 
vulnerability in the VoIP protocol [1-3] some even describe how to use the above 
tools to achieve enumeration or even exploit of a VoIP system. There also several 
books on the exploitation of VoIP [4]. This level of information availability, 
coupled with the increasing numbers of encoded ready to use hostile tools is a 
malevolent landscape waiting to happen.  
In the last three to five years many large infrastructure providers as previously 
mentioned have started to offer integrated IP/Telephony/VoIP solutions for the 
home user. This current status quo now provides the attackers with not only 
knowledge that has moved from tacit (theoretical attack) to explicit (code tools for 
exploit) but also an increased opportunity for exploit and compromise of hosts 
through the deployment of VoIP systems in homes sees for the first time viability 
of attacking these systems for gain. 
MOTIVATIONS FOR ATTACKING VOIP 
Most of the key drivers for motivation of attacking and compromising VoIP 
systems is built around financial gain in a similar fashion to the PABX 
compromises of past. The attacker's motivation is to use the victim system as a 
conduit for malfeasant traffic and have the victim bear the charged cost of any 
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such activity. The other motivations of course are still classic disruption or denial 
of service to the victim. 
FINANCIAL GAIN 
There are numerous telephone calling cards one can use to call cheaply overseas 
that utilize systems legitimately and use technology such as VoIP to lower costs 
for providers of the service. The low cost is enabled through the use of VoIP 
technologies. The use of a calling card normally involves calling a legitimate 
number and then keying in the long distance number you wish to call. As a result 
of keying in the number you are then normally redirected through a cheaper 
service typically VoIP and calls are initiated to the requested number. The call 
quality of these systems is sometimes degraded but then the costs are significantly 
lower for users of these systems.  
The illegitimate use of these systems would see compromised VoIP systems 
being utilised to route the incoming calls to the destination at the expense of the 
owner of the compromised system.  The other method is to use rerouting to dial 
premium subscriber-based phone lines that charge a set rate per minute for the 
connection to the end user typically on a range of between $1 - $8 a minute again 
typically depending on the type of service offered. The difference in price after 
servicing fees from the provider of the premium number then becomes the profit 
that is sent to the entity that set up the premium number service for providing the 
service normally the compromiser of the system.  
Malicious users could hide much of their activity by distributing the call load 
across a multitude of compromised devices in essence a distributed compromise 
of service. By spreading the call load across a wide range of compromised 
devices it affords the malicious users good protections from detection by the 
owners of the systems. Modifying one of John Paul Getty sayings illustrates this 
concept “it is far easier to steal a $1 from 100 people than to try and steal $100 
from one”. By using this modus operandi not only do attackers lower their 
forensic fingerprint but also make it difficult for intrusion detection systems and 
other methods of monitoring to detect a malfeasant call.  
DENIAL OF SERVICE 
Denial of Service (DoS) is a simple and well proven attack method which can be 
achieved by flooding network connections, socket/port exhaustion, or resource 
exhaustion of a service or server by overloading with the end result being memory 
or CPU exhaustion. This exhaustion of service can have catastrophic outcomes 
resulting in servers halting and rebooting or simply service to be useless due to 
performance degradation. Motivations for this could be blackmail as has been 
evinced already in businesses where availability is crucial for business e.g online 
casinos where if you want to be able to collect revenues you have to be available 
and online. This availability nexus is as previously mentioned an Achilles heel for 
service of this kind.  
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The other motivation is to gain a competitive advantage over a competitor 
remembering not all businesses behave ethically. If people cannot contact you on 
the phone service you are using it becomes increasingly difficult to conduct 
business with you and they will seek out an alternative. A DoS in these types of 
cases does not have to be 24/7 to be effective, attacks at key times during a 
business calendar can have devastating consequences for any business 
sustainability or viability.  
DETECTION OF MALICIOUS ACTIVITY 
The use of intrusion detection systems whether they be host based or network 
based is one preferred way of detecting malicious activity on  a network directed 
towards VoIP systems. Many of the attack or enumeration tools such as 
SIPvicious tool suite [5]when used in default mode are overt, verbose and readily 
identified. The following extract from a system log file is an example of a 
transaction between a system and the SIPvicious tool suite  
UDP message received [416] bytes : 
OPTIONS sip:100@xx3.xxx.xxx.xxx SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.160.67.18:5061;branch=z9hG4bK-
2559388112;rport 
Content-Length: 0 
From: "sipvicious"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>; 
tag=6362613137353765313363340131303635333036333336 
Accept: application/sdp 
User-Agent: friendly-scanner 
To: "sipvicious"sip:100@1.1.1.1 
Contact: sip:100@10.160.67.18:5061 
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS 
Call-ID: 1020236891970287777884434 
Max-Forwards: 70 
 
As can be clearly seen as highlighted there are hallmarks or indicators of a 
SIPvicious based attack on a system. It is a simple task to write some intrusion 
detection system rules from this exchange. An example Snort rule could be 
alert UDP any any → any (msg:”sipvicious default 
scan”; content: “|736970766963696f7573|”;) 
 
This rule simply traps for any UDP connection that has the string sipvicious in it. 
Alternatively the string friendly-scanner could also be trapped. With the use of 
dynamic rules one could also for instance trap the next 500 packets from the 
attackers IP to be able to examine any connections or activity being undertaken by 
the attacking IP. 
The caveat on these types of attacks is that the use of these tools is as provided by 
the author and that are typically initiated by inexperienced attackers often referred 
to as script kiddies or n00bs. The inexperienced attacker does often not know or 
often understand the tool they are using and that they are leaving behind a large 
forensic fingerprint. One could further postulate that these types of attacks are not 
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organised criminals or experienced cyber criminals searching for vulnerable VoIP 
systems. These attackers instead will utilise methods that are relatively 
anonymous and will avoid detection by intrusion detection rule sets in use. This 
exact scenario now presents another problem for providers or users of VoIP 
systems who wish to protect the service. The problem is that to protect a VoiP 
system from compromise one has to assume that all connections are malicious 
and subject them to intense inspection and scrutiny and or use a whitelist which 
defeats the purpose largely of having a open connection. One of the known 
degraders of any network based system and in particular VoIP based systems 
performance is latency, by performing any form of packet inspection packet 
latency will be increased. Hence remedy through the enforcement of large rulesets 
and packet inspections may in fact be worse than the overall complaint. 
USING SIMPLE HONEYPOTS TO DETECTING SCANNING OR 
ENUMERATION 
A talk by Sjur Usken [6] outlines a method for using SIPp [7] and a packet 
logging tool Daemonlogger [8] as a simple honeypot for the detection of scanning 
and enumeration by an attacker of VoIP systems. The SIPp suite is a test tool or 
traffic generator for the SIP protocol that is legitimately used to test systems. It 
enables call establishment, call flow analysis, message statistics and the testing of 
a range of features found in VoIP systems. This suite provides the basis for low 
level interactions with the attacking entity.   
Daemonlogger is a program that can sniff network traffic and either spool it to 
disk or redirect it to another network interface. In the executing of the current 
research it is used to write the potentially malicious traffic to disk and log it for 
later forensic analysis. Daemonlogger uses rulesets in tcpdump syntax an example 
rule follows 
dst port 5060 or dst port 16384 or dst port 5061 or 
dst port 1720 
 
will trap for connections on ports 5060, 16384, 5061, 1720. Once there are 
packets trapped then action is initated to record the packets. 
The system being used in our research utilizes rudiments of the system proposed 
and used by [6]. The system is replicated across a number of sensors we have 
installed in a honeypot system that utilizes Surfnet IDS as its supporting 
infrastructure. SurfnetIDS uses a collection of sensors that are connected back to 
logging infrastructure via VPN. In our setup there is a multitude of recordings 
occurring. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 5(2) 
 
41 
 
 
Basic SQL  The sensors report their VoIP activity back to a customized 
SQL database for logging of attack data. No packets are 
captured. 
Daemonlogger  File based logging that daemonlogger provides on each 
sensor, any files produced by daemonlogger are sent back via 
SCP to the central logging server for storage and analysis. 
This is in addition to a full dump of the Ethernet connection 
using tcpdump –w 
SurfIDS_Snort The sensors report via VPN to a Snort based database using 
custom IDS based rules that respond as a result of a known 
VoIP attack. These records are incorporated into the 
SurfnetIDS reporting mechanisms. In this record the 
attacking IP numbers are also matched against the GeoIP 
suite for country of origin information. 
 
As the honeypot research is formative and utilizing empirical learning to modify 
and adapt the honeypot previous experience in deploying honeypot research 
indicates that there is a scientific need to capture attack data with a multitude of 
types. The use of multiple streams or samples also allows the use of multiple tools 
and techniques to validate findings or investigate observed phenomena. 
TECHNIQUES UNDER DEVELOPMENT 
Apart from deep packet inspection in Wireshark and other packet analysis tools, 
the research is attempting to find suitable methods for automated alert and 
response to VoIP oriented attacks.  
AUTOMATED ALERTING DEVELOPMENTS 
This is already enabled by the research modus operandii to some degree by the 
use of Snort and custom IDS rulesets we are developing for VoIP systems. IDS 
systems in combination with analysis consoles such as ACID or Base or 
SnortAlert allow for much of this systematic alerting or monitoring to occur. Or in 
the case of this research enable timely inspection and review of attacks on the 
systems. 
The research is also looking at methods for using daemonlogger to redirect output 
to another interface that becomes a trigger response i.e any traffic on that interface 
indicates potential malicious activity. This could be a idle VPN connection that 
when triggered will initiate connection that then results in an escalation of 
response or monitoring.  
The on-demand production of graphical representation of activity using Graphviz 
[9] produced images using Afterglow is also another approach being developed in 
the research. The need for using graphical methods for analysis in combating the 
complexity of alert data received by network systems is well established. The 
ability to generate graphs on demand allows a new lense or view of the dataset. 
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AUTOMATED RESPONSE DEVELOPMENT  
Automated response is largely enabled by IDS in this case Snort and development 
of dynamic rules in combination with firewall or host.deny responses. This 
dynamic use of IDS as always is a balancing act between false positives and 
legitimate usability of the system. Another factor that increases problems is that 
VoIP systems use UDP for transport and the resulting transmissions lack the 
formal controls and discipline with respect to packet sequence, latency and other 
attributes that a TCP based transmission can be afforded.  
As mentioned previously the use of dynamic rules in Snort allows for a variety of 
actions not all of them need be a complete denial of route to be effective. The 
triggered recording of attack sessions allows for smaller analysis parcels to be 
produced rather than having to trawl large packet capture for small packet 
sequences this produces significant efficiencies in analysis. 
Response via device fingerprint spoofing is a well used paradigm in honeypots 
and honeyd [10] is just one exemplar of the technique. The honeypot system will 
use known robust fingerprints of a device to fool the attacker into believing they 
are in fact scanning or interacting with a real device when in fact it is the 
honeypot. The current research is attempting to generate reliable system 
fingerprints using NMAP an active network fingerprinter and p0f a passive 
network fingerprinter for commonly used ADSL VoIP enabled routers. In 
addition via the production of simple PERL scripts we are also trying to emulate 
basic service responses to probes by some of the commonly used tools. The aim 
of the scripts is not to provide perfect emulation of service but merely to mimic 
standard responses in an attempt to get the attacker to escalate the attack to a 
higher level of interaction and attack. 
CONCLUSION 
The research is currently ongoing and should produce systems capable of a more 
realistic emulation of vulnerable VoIP systems. The research purposefully focuses 
on VoIP system vulnerability and not standard honeypot systems as there is a 
significant and successful body of knowledge based around  these systems 
already. It should however, be noted that much of the research is underpinned by 
successful techniques and methods from within the existing honeypot knowledge 
domain. 
The research has already uncovered increasing levels of probing and enumeration 
of VoIP systems from a variety of locations on the Internet. The next stage of the 
research is to start classifying the level of enumeration and attack being 
undertaken by these attackers to determine if the activity is mere scanning or 
escalatory in nature and activity that is genuinely seeking to compromise the 
systems.  
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